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Symbolic Public Goods and the Coordination of Collective Action:  
A Comparison of Local Development In India and Indonesia 
Abstract 
Most economists think of common property as physical –  a body of water, a forest – and as 
bounded within geographic space.  In this paper, building on work in social theory, I argue that 
common property can also be social – defined within symbolic space.  People can be bound by 
well-defined symbolic agglomerations that have characteristics similar to common property.  I 
call these “symbolic public goods” (SPGs) and make the case that such constructs are central to 
understanding collective action.  The point is illustrated by contrasting how conceptions of 
nationalism in Indonesia and India created SPGs that resulted in very different strategies of local 
development.  Indonesia emphasized collective action by the poor that resulted in a form of 
regressive taxation, enforced by the ideology of svadaya gotong royong (community self-help) 
that was both internalized and coercively enforced.  India emphasized democratic decentralization 
via the panchayat system driven by the Gandhian ideology of gram swaraj (self-reliant villages).  
This has resulted in an unusual equity-efficiency tradeoff; Indonesia has delivered public services 
more efficiently than India, but at the cost of democratic freedoms and voice.  I argue that the 
challenge for these countries is to not undermine their existing SPGs but to build on them; 
Indonesia should retain the spirit of svadaya gotong royong but to channel it in an equitable and 
democratic direction, while India should build the capacity of the panchayat system by giving it 
fiscal teeth, while promoting underutilized institutions such as Gram Sabhas that encourage 
accountability and transparency.    3
Symbolic Public Goods 
 
Most economists think of common property as physical – a plot of land, a body of water, a forest 
– and as bounded within geographic space.  In this paper, building on work in social theory, I 
argue that common property can also be social – defined within symbolic space.
2  People can be 
bound by well defined social circles, creating agglomerations that have characteristics similar to 
common property.  I call these circles and agglomerations “symbolic public goods” and make the 
case that such constructs are central to understanding collective action.  Typically, when 
anthropologists discuss the functioning of common property resources (CPRs), they contrast 
indigenous, local meanings with routinizing state-level bureaucratic apparatuses, that circulate at 
the national and transnational level.  However, national-level symbolic institutions can also 
percolate downward – shifting local constructions of identity and social organization and 
changing the incentives for collective behavior.  As development policy becomes increasingly 
decentralized, this “production of locality” (Appadurai, 1997) plays a central role in shaping the 
institutions of decentralization.  Thus symbols can have important tangible, material outcomes.  
The point is illustrated by a comparative analysis of constructions of nationalism in India and 
Indonesia, and the significant impact that they have had on local development and public service 
delivery.   
Economists and social theorists think very differently about collective action.  
Economists, at least since Olson (1965), have believed that when individuals make decisions 
about whether to participate in collective activities, a reasonable approximation of how these 
decisions are made can be provided by rational choice models of materially driven individual 
behavior.  Typically, economic models focus on the costs and benefits of participation: How large 
a share of the collective good will the agent obtain by participating?  Is it worth the loss in 
income and time? The power of game theory is then applied to examine how these choices are 
made strategically with others in the group.  Such models can result in a range of outcomes, from 
Olson’s “free-rider problem” to Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons,” with the cards stacked 
against reaching an efficient outcome.   
Later scholars, such as Ostrom (1990), have tried to correct this. Basing their analysis on 
field observations that demonstrate the success of collective action in a variety of settings, they 
                                                 
2 I am attempting here to inform economists’ notions of public goods and ‘signaling’ with the work of 
social theorists such as Arjun Appadurai and Pierre Bourdieu, who locate economic action within social 
and cultural arenas, to achieve a better understanding of collective behavior.  In doing so I also rely on 
Michael Suk-Young Chwe’s recent attempts to bring game theoretic notions to bear on social theory. 
   4
allow for social institutions which generate norms, impose sanctions and improve the incentives 
for collective action.   Usually, these scholars have incorporated socially derived incentives that 
affect individual choices by explicitly modeling the sanctions that are imposed by communities, 
or/and have incorporated the effects of “social norms” directly into the preference set.   
A second approach followed by economists who incorporate social effects has made the 
models dynamic, allowing for repeated interactions with the same group of actors.  Under these 
circumstances, individuals have to consider how their behavior today may generate a reaction by 
others in their community tomorrow.  So long as individuals value payoffs in the future more than 
payoffs today, and expect to interact on a regular basis, cooperative outcomes will ensue, and 
these may become “habit forming” (e.g.  Seabright 1997; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002).   
A third approach looks at the evolution of norms of cooperation (e.g. Sethi and 
Somanathan, 1999).   Under certain circumstances, societies may evolve so as to select 
individuals who have a strong desire for collective activity, weeding out  “mutants” who are more 
narrowly self-interested.   This provides an explanation  why norms of communal living may be 
internalized in some societies.   The logic here is Spencerian – the core value is consumption, 
everyone is maximizing their economic welfare, and those who do this inefficiently are 
eliminated.
3 
Much of social theory follows a more collectivist logic, emphasizing views derived from 
Durkheim rather than Spencer, and in some ways all of it is about group action – though not 
necessarily about collective action in the strict sense.  Communities can “think.”  (Douglas 1986)  
Social norms, identity, “culture,” etc. are collectively determined – with individuals, subservient 
to the collective will, tied into the larger goals of the potlatch. This finds its ultimate expression in 
the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, who emphasizes meaningful communication in  trying to 
uncover the linguistic and symbolic structures that facilitate human interaction within society.   A 
parallel stream of thinking, initiated by Weber, emphasizes the role of history, social 
organization, and what economists call “path dependency,” i.e. considering a broader set of 
motives than those focused narrowly on consumption.  Talcott Parsons (it is interesting to note 
that both Weber and Parsons were originally trained as economists) attempted to integrate 
Durkheim and Weber by carving out a role for individual agency within this larger structural 
frame, and this has been taken by Geertz and others into the realm of symbolic anthropology.  
Here, the goal is to uncover the inner symbolic logic of cultures and communities: to understand 
via “thick description” the strategies that are used to make up the economic and symbolic 
exchanges that create a meaningful community.  
                                                 
3 See Baland and Platteau (2003) for a review of the literature on the role of institutions in collective action.   5
Another movement integrating structure and agency is Bourdieu’s notion of  practice 
theory, which focuses more on “what people do rather than what they say.”  The idea here is to 
see how human action is embedded within a general realm of habitus —the set of durable 
principles,  - practices, beliefs, taboos, rules, representations, rituals, symbols, etc. that provide a 
group of individuals with a sense of group identity and a consequent feeling of security and 
belonging.
4   For Bourdieu cultural markers, within habitus, provide a way of classifying 
hierarchical relationships between groups – not only classifying other groups, but for members of 
a group to differentiate themselves from others.   By positioning a group within the social 
hierarchy, culture affects the sense of the possible.  For those at the high end of the hierarchy, it 
provides the means to maintain their high position; while for those at the low end it limits 
aspirations, creates discrimination, and blocks mobility.  Bourdieu argues, therefore, that culture 
is a form of capital and situates symbolic action in the center of the struggle for power and 
domination within groups. 
This divide between economic and social theory provides an entry point for the present 
paper.  Economists emphasize material rationality and methodological individualism, and social 
theorists, as methodological holists, tend to be far more concerned with how social organization is 
structured and contested. 
Recent work by economists has attempted to bridge this divide.  An important effort is 
the work of Michael Suk-Young Chwe (1999, 2001), which demonstrates how collective action 
has to distinguish between structure and strategy.  Chwe’s basic argument goes as follows:  Most 
models of collective action assume, implicitly, some pre-existent “common knowledge.”
5  That 
is, when a group of individuals plays a collective action game, whether static or dynamic, it is 
assumed that individual A knows the payoffs, information sets, costs, incentives, possible moves, 
etc. faced by individual B.  Individual B, in turn, knows all this about individual A, and further 
knows that individual A knows everything about individual B.  Individual A, in turn, knows that 
Individual B knows that Individual A knows, and so on. This common knowledge assumption 
then permits games of strategy to be played with a common understanding of the rules of the 
game—everyone knows what everyone else is playing.  For instance, a cricket player persuaded 
to play baseball will be quickly confused – enough to not be able to understand or appreciate the 
skill, strategy, and actions of the other players.  It is this aspect of coordination and common 
                                                 
4 This is my imperfect  account of Bourdieu’s definition of habitus: “a system of durable, transposable 
dispositions…  principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the 
operations necessary in order to attain them.”  (Bourdieu, 1990, 1998). 
5 Also see Bardhan (1993) on this point.   6
understanding that common knowledge attempts to capture – it plays a coordinating function that 
is a precondition for collective activity and collective cannot occur in its absence.  Common 
knowledge is arguably the core concept behind such amorphous notions as “trust” and “social 
capital,” which figure prominently in the discourse on collective action.      
Chwe goes even further, arguing that much of what we call “culture” is about the 
generation of common knowledge (Chwe 2001) – about turning “weak” ties into “strong” ones. 
(Granovetter 1973)   Public rituals, sites and events, such as festivals, celebrations, churches, 
temples, even the Olympic Games, help people to build a sense of community.  In this sense, 
Chwe is simply borrowing from symbolic anthropology.  Victor Turner (1982), for instance, 
describes festivals as "generally connected with expectable culturally shared events."  He 
suggests that when a social group celebrates a particular event it "celebrates itself" by 
"manifesting in symbolic form what it conceives to be its essential life."   Thus, festivals and 
other such shared collective things serve to build social cohesion by reinforcing ties within a 
community.  David Mosse (1997), in work examining the management of common property 
resources in Tamil Nadu, makes a similar point.  He argues that both symbolic and material 
interests matter in collective action, and that “Tanks, like village temples, are public institutions 
expressive of social relations, status, prestige and honor.”  They are not only physical inputs but 
also “repositories of symbolic resources.”  
Thus, in order to understand collective action it is crucial to understand its social context 
via the common knowledge generating processes that underlie it.  Yet such processes are 
themselves the product of strategy and contestation.  They can take a variety of forms — 
intangible processes of identity formation such as “nationalism”, physical entities like mosques 
and temples, and periodic ritual events like festivals.  All these share characteristics of public 
goods – in the sense that they can be simultaneously “non-rival,” or capable of being 
simultaneously “consumed” by many individuals; and sometimes “non-excludable,” wherein it is 
not possible to deny anyone access to the good .  For these reasons, I will call all such goods 
“symbolic public goods.”     There are important cases where excludability may be built into the 
consumption of the good, in which case they might more accurately be described as club goods. 
An important function of symbolic public goods (henceforth SPGs) is coordination —to 
generate common knowledge.  There are all manner of public goods and activities that serve this 
purpose, and many have both symbolic and material functions.  This is true in particular of 
common property resources, which serve an important material purpose but are also often sacred 
spaces or symbols of royal or colonial power.  But separating these functions permits the 
identification of two linked but separate sources of strategic behavior.  Some public goods – such   7
as village festivals – may be more uniform in their symbolic function, while others, such as a 
clinic or a school, may be more hybrid.  I will, therefore, call public goods that have a primarily 
symbolic function “uniform;” and those that have a mixed function “hybrid.” “Pure” might have 
been a better adjective than “uniform”, but it could be confused with the “pure” in “pure public 
goods,” the latter being completely non-rival and non-excludable.  Therefore, SPGs may be either 
uniform or hybrid and, at the same time, pure or impure.  All are, I would argue, essential to an 
understanding of the role of “community” in collective action.   
  Such SPGs are often repositories of memory and identity – testaments to  major binding 
events in the community.  In this sense they may be closely linked to the evolution of social 
norms and may serve as the symbolic embodiment of those norms – i.e. the public 
acknowledgement of a shared perspective.   Norms need reinforcement mechanisms.  Identity is 
not some fixed and exogenously provided entity which people either choose or inherit, as 
economic models tend to assume (e.g. Akerlof and Kranton 2000). It represents strategic 
interactions within a community that are usually embedded within SPGs.   A feeling of kinship or 
commonality with another person needs to be expressed and reinforced in concrete ways in order 
to be stable. This could happen via reciprocal gifts when only two people are involved, or, when 
the size of the network increases and gifts are not enough – it needs a potlatch – a whole system 
of gift exchanges with coded and structured meanings may come into being.   When such a 
system of exchange serves a purely material purpose within, for example, an expanding economy, 
it will quickly transit into a market based system (e.g. Kranton, 1996).  However, communities 
cannot exist in the absence of common knowledge and the exchanges could also be purely 
symbolic – strengthening networks and establishing “trust.”  When the network becomes dense 
enough via intensified interaction, or becomes large enough via increased membership size – 
systems of reciprocity become embodied within SPGs which serve as repositories of collective 
identity and historical memory.    
  Communities are not, of course, always formed through tedious evolutionary processes.  
They can be created far more quickly.  A major exogenous event – e.g. a terrible famine or a 
devastating war – can bring people together to cope with the hardship that ensues.  A church or 
temple may be built to mark the event, an annual commemoration or celebration which serves to 
reinforce a group’s sense of community may be instituted.  SPGs thus play an important role in 
establishing the structures and rituals that help define collective identity.  In a stable equilibrium 
they define the “conjuncture”
6 of  social life and are associated with what Appadurai (1997) calls 
                                                 
6 This is a crude inversion of Alfred Marshall’s use of this word to describe the social context of economic 
behavior.    8
“pragmatic” rituals that help reproduce and reify communities.  But, as Appadurai argues, it 
would be a mistake to view this in a static context because communities themselves can be 
“produced.”  Shifts in the relative power of groups, or in information technologies, or in the 
nature of the state can result in the formation of new SPGs  that compete with existing forms to 
establish new circles of power.  So, SPGs may be the result of endogenous decisions and their 
construction a potent method of rallying people into a movement by forming a dense, cohesive 
network.  This is particularly true when the value signaled by the SPG resonates deeply with a 
large enough group of people.   Several examples come to mind: consider for example the 
calculated imitation of classical Roman martial rituals and architecture symbolically used by the 
Nazi party to express nationalist imperial pride (Burleigh 2000), or the construction of the 
Petronas towers in Kuala Lampur in the heyday of the East Asian “miracle.”  In more micro 
settings, the construction of large and flashy churches by evangelical American Protestants in 
certain poor areas of developing countries serves as a potent symbol associating a religion with 
the promise of wealth and mobility.   
  In other words, SPGs are not only symbols of established power, they can be volleys shot 
in an attempt to acquire power.  The (sometimes literal) construction of an SPG results in the 
symbolic construction of a community, and this process of construction generates power by 
establishing control over a body of people.   Power is not only acquired by constructing a new 
SPG, it can also be the result of power dynamics within it.  Moving up or down in the hierarchy 
of an SPG’s power structure is closely associated with status mobility.  Thus, SPGs can result in 
publicly observable competitive expenditures that can be quite substantial – for instance in the 
celebration of temple festivals. (Rao 2001) As in a competitive potlatch, this can sometimes be a 
sustaining equilibrium wherein a high level of expenditure on symbolic activities is essential to 
maintain status within the community.  Thus, games of social status may be symbolically acted 
upon with actions involving public or club goods (Basu 1989;  Bloch, Rao and Desai 2004).  Not 
all communities may be centered on one SPG.  Just as identities can be varied and overlapping, so 
can communities and their binding symbols.  And nor do only individuals compete for status 
within the context of one SPG: the same village may have competing sources of symbolic power 
and social status. SPGs can, in this way, prove to serve as the fulcrum around which endogenous 
coalitions of individuals are formed within a community.   
  SPGs can, as is obvious from the discussion above, both unite and divide.  A well defined 
geographic area can have several intersecting SPGs within it.  These can in turn sometimes 
cooperate and sometimes compete to create a logic of overlapping communities and identities.  A 
village, for instance, may be a “community” in one sense with SPGs – common land, a well, a   9
post-office –that span  its population cohesively and thus help define a space of common 
knowledge within which individuals act.  But these individuals may also be subdivided into 
several other communities –  for instance, by religion.  Consider a village with Hindus and 
Muslims, with their associated SPGs (temples and mosques) and rituals.  The Hindus may 
themselves be subdivided by caste and become identified by caste-specific SPGs (e.g. caste 
associations, caste-specific wells and shrines), and the Muslims by different types of mosques 
(e.g. an old mosque constructed by a long-forgotten zamindar, newer mosques constructed by 
newly wealthy and radicalized migrants to the Gulf).      
  SPGs are, in these ways, centrally related to the acquisition and maintenance of power.  
And the actions that involve the creation or construction of a new SPG can be potent signals of a 
new power dynamic.  But sometimes the publicly observable destruction of a SPG serves as a 
signal for the formation of a new one: think of the symbolic destruction of the Babri Masjid and 
its effectiveness as the signal of a new, muscular Hindu nationalism; or the World Trade Center.   
Thus, in situations of asymmetric information, such as when a new and relatively unknown group 
wants to communicate a shift in its political intentions, or when a newly wealthy family wants to 
demonstrate its wealth and thus use its new-found economic status to acquire social leverage, the 
construction (or destruction) of an SPG can serve as a very effective signal.   
  While SPGs are collectively defined, strategy and contestation within them depend on  
individual agency.  But individuals can also drive resistance to them: if the control of an SPG is 
indicative of elite status, less powerful individuals who have reason to disagree or oppose such 
elites (but who do not have the physical and symbolic resources to create competing SPGs) may 
react with what Scott (1995) calls “weapons of the weak.”  Instead of abiding by the rituals of 
SPG participation, they may “foot-drag,” abscond, hide, and otherwise decline to participate in a 
manner both subversive and less than overt.  Such resistance too can help define a community of 
the disenfranchized via its relatively invisible rituals and symbols.    
  For instance, in Suharto’s  “New Order” Indonesia, young women often expressed their 
opposition to his dictatorial authority—which was for a long time dedicated to obstructing  
organized Islam—by covering their heads with a jilbab (hijab), causing this headgear to become a 
fashionable symbol of resistance to Suharto’s rule. (Hefner 2000)  Conversely, women in Iran 
often wear designer clothes and make-up under the chadors imposed upon them by Islamic 
authorities.    Such covert forms of resistance can lead to social movements – in Indonesia 
wearing the jilbab became a symbol of the pro-democracy movement that ultimately led to 
Suharto’s resignation; and the sartorial resistance in Iran could well augur a similar result.  Note 
that when the rules and rituals of SPGs are blatantly and overtly violated, this can —as with SPG   10
destruction—be a signal of power. The satyagraha movement in India used symbolic resistance 
against SPGs associated with British rule as a central element of its strategy.  And the South 
Indian sandalwood smuggler Veerapan’s legend was built on his ability to blatantly violate 
conservation laws while eluding the police.   
  In short, as much as SPGs “create” communities, they do not supplant or suppress 
individual agency.  In fact, individual action plays an important role in how SPGs are 
strategically positioned, interpreted, and consumed. 
  I will now briefly illustrate the salience of SPGs by comparing the very different local 
development and decentralization strategies followed by India and Indonesia.  Data for this comes 
from several rounds of fieldwork, collaboratively conducted with several coauthors, in Java, 




Links to Local Development 
 
Development is fast decentralizing and development agencies and governments are increasingly 
relying on the presumed power of collective action to increase “voice” and equitably deliver 
public services (Bardhan, 2002).  The “Community Driven Development” (CDD) portfolio of the 
World Bank for instance has risen from $250 million ten years ago to seven billion dollars today.  
Much of the justification for this has come from the premise that tapping into a community’s  
“social capital” is “empowering” for the poor.  Critics have contended that this emphasis on 
community development can result in the capture of resources by elites (Abraham and Platteau 
2004), which has led to an increased focus on the role of inequality on collective action (Bardhan 
and Mukherjee 2003, Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002). 
  Other critics have begun to ask what “participation” really means and whether 
“participatory development” is, in fact, leading to the empowerment of the poor (Mosse 2001; 
Mansuri and Rao 2004).  A crucial issue here is not just inequality of wealth in a community, but 
social heterogeneity and the consequent inequality in power. (Abraham and Platteau 2004) The 
empirical evidence on the impact of social heterogeneity is mixed, with the evidence suggesting 
that it is bad, irrelevant, or even good for collective action. (Mansuri and Rao 2004) The role of 
heterogeneity and inequality in collective action, and the extent to which community- based 
approaches are truly participatory and empowering, depends crucially on how well collective 
                                                 
7 My co-investigators in Indonesia are Vivi Alatas, Victoria Beard, and Menno Pradhan.  In India they are 
Tim Besley and Rohini Pande.   11
action is coordinated.  This requires an understanding of the critical role of SPGs, the distribution 
of status and power within the village and communities that they represent, and the distribution of 
control within them.  The relative impact of inequality and social heterogeneity may work via the 
mediating influence of SPGs.   
  India and Indonesia are both culturally and geographically diverse countries that  
achieved independence within two years of each other.   They have had centuries of social and 
economic exchange. They have important cultural similarities. Yet they have followed very 
different strategies of political and economic development, with Indonesia turning increasingly 
autocratic soon after independence – till its turn towards democracy at the end of the Suharto era 
in 1998.  India, on the other hand, has been a stable democracy since its independence, with a 
vigorously independent election commission.   Both countries have begun to increasingly 
decentralize since the 1990s, with Indonesia devolving powers to state and district governments, 
and India doing the same to village and district panchayats (governing councils) which are 
elected.    
  Both countries have survived ups and downs in their economies, but as of 2001 their per 
capita incomes were very close with India’s at PPP $2570, compared to PPP $2990 in Indonesia.
8 
Yet Indonesia has been far more successful in providing public services to the poor.  One 
indicator of this is that while 76 percent percent of children complete primary school in India, 91 
percent complete it in Indonesia, even though India spends 7.2 percent of its GNP on primary 
education, while Indonesia spends only 3.2 percent.   Such stark differences in human 
development indicators occur for health as well, with India spending 0.9 percent of GNP on 
health while Indonesia spends 0.6 percent, yet India’s under-5 mortality rate is 93 and Indonesia’s 
is 45.   Indonesia has therefore  not only been more effective at providing public services, it has 
also been far more efficient.   What accounts for this stark difference in performance?   I argue 
below that SPGs have played an important role.       
 
Collective Action and community development in Indonesia 
 
Any discussion of Indonesian society has to start with the work of Geertz and, in particular, with  
his monumental work, The Religion of Java, which laid out many of the themes that have played 
a central role in understandings of Javanese culture.  Geertz’s work may have even shaped how 
Indonesia’s nationalism, with its strong Javanese flavor, has been articulated and imagined.   
                                                 
8 All data in this paragraph are from the World Development Report 2004.   12
Geertz outlined several competing categories of groups, ideologies, and cultures within 
rural Javanese society.  The first was the existence of three major sub-traditions – the Abangan – 
who are nominally Muslim but stress a more traditional form of Javanese religion consisting of 
rituals such as the slametan—more on this later—spirit beliefs, magic and sorcery.  Next, the 
Santri —pious Muslims who tended to be the more wealthy traders who identified with the ulema 
and so emphasize pilgrimage to Mecca, prayers, the Fast, and such things. And finally the Prijaji, 
upper-class Javanese who derive their identity from Hindu–Javanese courts of the pre-colonial 
period, and who identify with the Ramayana, the Mahabharata, and other traditions that derive 
from Hinduism and Buddhism. 
  Geertz’s village was defined by interactions between these groups and the sub-groups 
within them.  For instance the Santri were further subdivided into Mohamadiyas, who were 
Islamic reformists intent on modernist social change while keeping within Islamic traditions; and 
the more conservative Nahdatul Ulama (NU), who believed in establishing a political presence 
for Islam within Indonesia while connecting to the larger Islamic world.  Neither, however, were 
Wahhabi. They represented a more civil version of Islam derived from Indian (primarily Gujarati) 
traders who had introduced the religion to Indonesia.   
  Applying the idea of SPGs to these groups and assessing their implications for collective 
activity, we should first note that the Prijaji barely figure in the politics of Geertz’s village, where 
the primary action is between the Abangan, Mohamadiyas and NUs.  The Abangan’s main SPG is 
the tradition of the slametan –  a ritual where a group of people (almost always male heads of 
households) get together to sanctify an auspicious event – a birth, a funeral, etc., where, typically, 
a village elder recites some religious (Koranic) versus, others make ritualized speeches, and a 
meal is begun but not completed (people take the food home and consume it later).  Slametans are 
required for so many activities that there is a reciprocity associated with them.  One has to belong 
to the slametan circuit to belong to the community, and this can be a very expensive proposition. 
  The Santris, on the other hand, socialize primarily through prayer meetings and Koran 
reading groups.  To quote Geertz: “For the santri, the sense of community – of ummat – is 
primary.  Islam is seen as a set of concentric social circles, wider and wider communities …. – 
spreading away from the individual santri where he stands: a great society of equal believers 
constantly repeating the name of Prophet, going through the prayers, chanting the Koran.” 
The Islamic community is centered around mosques and prayer groups. Santris in Geertz’s 
reading of his village, were the globalized community. Links via commerce and religion 
connected them closely to the world outside the village.  They were also – via the Mohamadiya – 
the modernizers; and, via the NU, the democraticizers.  The NU were themselves in conflict with   13
the Mohamidiya. They were far more keen to modernize the education system and force 
Indonesia into the modern world, but wary of direct political engagement.  
  Geertz’s interpretation of rural Javanese life has been refined somewhat by more recent 
scholarship.  In particular, anthropologists (Beatty 1999) have argued that the Santri do not 
represent a subtradition as much as a smaller group within a larger Islamic world; and that the 
slametan is not a pre-Islamic ritual but is based much more on Sufi traditions within Islam  
(Woodward 1988). The division, it is argued, is not between Abangan and Santri but between 
Kejawen (the pre-Islamic Javanese culture which subsumes both Abangan and Prijaji) and the 
more recent Islamicizing trends personified by the Santri.  Since almost everyone in Java is 
Muslim, this is really a subdivision within Islam, and not really a chasm between Islam and other 
traditions.   
  Post-colonial Indonesia was dominated by upper-class Muslim Prijaji and its history in 
the decades following independence can be seen as being primarily about the “Javanization” of 
the country (Ricklefs 2001). The ideological basis of Javanese or Kejawen belief is that social 
interaction is “collective, consensual and cooperative,”
9 as exemplified by the slametan.   Bowen 
(1986) argues, in an important article, that much of this is expressed in the term gotong royong or 
mutual assistance.  This term has become the framework for Indonesian nationalism and the basis 
for construction of a national tradition.    Sukarno, the “father” of Indonesia, attempted to use the 
notion to unify the diverse Islamic, non-Islamic, Nationalist and Communist groups in the new 
country by calling for a spirit of ke gotong royong (or gotong royong-ness).  Gotong royong 
provided a form of cultural legitimacy to state control.   
  With Sukarno’s ouster in a coup in 1967, his successor Suharto’s “New Order” economic 
policy had, especially in its initial phases, a two-pronged strategy – to lay policies in place that 
would enable high rates of growth, and to pass on the benefits of that growth to the rural poor.  
Part of the reason for this was a genuine desire on Suharto’s part to help the rural poor —  he saw 
himself as a son of farmers — but it was also part of a calculated strategy to minimize the 
influence of the Left, whose rise had been tolerated by Sukarno but which Suharto was 
determined to suppress (Hefner 2000).   An important element in this strategy was to dictatorially 
force the spirit of gotong royong  into hamlets and villages around the country.   Gotong Royong 
became a key element in strategies for developmental interventions in rural areas, and particularly 
in the mobilization of rural labor.  In order to protect the political and cultural unity of the 
Indonesian state, it had to be strongly authoritarian, and development had to proceed in a 
cooperative and collaborative manner.  By the early 1970s the term gotong royong  had been 
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complemented by the Sanskrit word svadaya or self-help and mobilizing svadaya gotong royong 
was central to the implementation of development policy (Bowen 1986).  
As Sullivan (1992) demonstrates in his detailed ethnography of local development in a 
Javanese community, the combination of an autocratic state and the principle of svadaya resulted 
in a form of forced labor.  In order to be a good Indonesian, one had to contribute labor and cash 
for development projects.  Collective action was the norm, not the exception.  It was very 
straightforward to mobilize:  grants received by the village headman (kepala desa) were low 
because they assumed that the mismatch between the size of the funds and the expected cost of 
the proposed project would be locally mobilized.  The headman whipped up contributions from 
the community which  were actively mobilized by ward leaders – kepala dusun in rural areas, 
RW/RT in urban areas.  Everyone was expected to contribute free labor – otherwise people felt 
they could easily be labeled unpatriotic or uncooperative and consequently face social, political, 
material and even physical sanctions.  It is never wise, in a dictatorship, to disobey the wishes of 
the dictator – and decentralization in pre-reformasi Indonesia was essentially a set of concentric 
circles of dictatorial rule justified by appealing to a sense of forging a strong Indonesia united by 
the beliefs of gotong royong and svadaya.  There was no choice except to participate. Bowen and 
Sullivan both point out that this model had much more to do with patterns established during the 
Japanese occupation of Indonesia than traditional Javanese traditions.  
In this manner, nationalism was the symbolic public good constructed by Indonesian 
political leaders, deploying “imagined” traditional beliefs that made the individual subservient to 
the community. It is not surprising that Benedict Anderson conceived of “imagined communities” 
largely from his deep understanding of Indonesian history (Anderson 1991).   Since most of this 
was undertaken in the context of a military dictatorship – there being not much room for 
individuals to dissent – it laid the foundation for the coordination of collective action.    
Suharto’s two-pronged strategy had spectacular results for over two decades, with very 
high rates of growth and substantial improvements in the living standards of the poor.  As we 
have seen, these improvements in living standards were achieved in a cost-effective way by, in 
effect, taxing the poor in the name of community participation.  In other words, under Suharto’s 
dictatorial rule there was a suppression of freedom, an implicitly regressive tax structure, but also, 
relative to India, excellent consequences for human development.  There was also a sharp 
increase in corruption and cronyism, and, ultimately, this led to the creation of an economy based 
on shaky macro-economic foundations.  The East Asian crises which started in 1997 shored up   15
anti-Suharto and pro-democracy forces in Indonesia, leading to his ouster in 1998 and to the 
emergence of a democratic order which has culminated in the recent political defeat of Sukarno’s 
daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri.
10 
Along with democracy has come a concerted effort to decentralize the political and fiscal 
authority of state and district governments.   At the village level, this has had several implications 
for SPGs.   The authority of the kepala desas and lurahs  is increasingly questioned.  But, as 
recent survey data demonstrate, the spirit of gotong royong has by no means disappeared.  Rather, 
it has been so deeply institutionalized that not abiding by it is sensed by people as a violation of a 
communitarian ethic, which remains even now part of the foundation of what it means to be a 
good Indonesian.  A recent survey shows that levels of participation in public goods construction 
remains high at 47 percent, and 59 percent of respondents say that they participate primarily 
because of “tradition” or “obligation.”  This has real consequences – 37 percent of the cost of 
village public goods are contributed by the community, with 60 percent  coming from the 
government.
11   
However, life is far less dictatorial now, and other important political players have 
emerged to compete with state authority.   Much of this can be seen in the profusion of mosques 
all over the countryside – some with shiny stainless steel domes, others painted blue or white, 
some with particularly large loudspeakers attached to their minarets,
12 others, more traditional, 
made of stone and brick with large tree-lined courtyards.  As Hefner (2000) shows, much of the 
resistance to Suharto was led by Islamic groups – in particular by NU and the Mohamediya.  To 
compete with these movements, Suharto attempted to create a “regimist Islam” with state-funded 
mosques staffed by government employees belonging to the Ministry of Religion.   Often, all 
three types – NU mosques, Mohamediya mosques and “Golkar”
13 mosques – exist in Indonesian 
villages, with competing spheres of authority.  In addition, immigrants to Malaysia or the Gulf 
signal their new-found wealth by building their own mosques.  And neighborhoods get together 
                                                 
10 Her first name was given her by an Indian—Biju Patnaik a close friend of Sukarno. Patnaik had 
participated in Indonesia’s war of independence as a fighter pilot, and went on to become one of India’s 
most prominent, and colorful, politicians. 
11 All data from UPP2 Evaluation baseline survey 2004. 
12 Some Imams are particularly proud of their loudspeakers.  I went to interview one in an empty but large 
mosque in the middle of the afternoon.  The Imam insisted on conducting the entire interview – which was 
mainly about the role of the mosque in local development activities –  speaking directly into the live 
microphone, presumably to demonstrate to the neighborhood that he was important enough to be 
interviewed by a World Bank official. 
13 Golkar was Suharto’s political party. It remains an important force in Indonesia.   16
sometimes to construct community mosques – which are usually more in the nature of small 
prayer rooms.  Even though these are physical entities, they symbolize different symbolic spaces 
– political alignments, religious differences, and even personal conflicts.  Mosque prayer groups 
are often the site of development activity — arenas where the beneficiaries of targeted programs 
are decided about or where a new project that requires volunteer work is publicized.  Mosques are 
also, often, the site of political activity, attracting charismatic speakers who attempt to mobilize 
their flock towards one political position or another.
14  In addition to such religiously driven 
SPGs, there are alternative sources of secular authority.  These include NGO-driven credit circles, 
women’s groups, and governing councils associated with different development schemes that are 
specially designed to counter traditional government authority structures with more decentralized 
and accountable institutions.   
Interestingly, donor agencies – particularly the World Bank – in a radical departure from 
practice, have structured their some of their Indonesia assistance in a manner that takes 
cognizance of SPGs.   This was done consciously via a series of Local Level Institution studies 
that attempted to measure the level of “social capital” in Indonesia.  In effect, these surveys (not 
unsurprisingly) uncovered the extent to which svadya gotong royong played a role in the life of 
Indonesian communities.  Legitimized by this, there was a conscious attempt to design projects 
that tried to steer community participation in a less dictatorial and more accountable direction via 
the multi-million dollar World Bank-assisted rural-focused Kecamatan Development Project 
(along with Urban Poverty Project, its urban counterpart: see Guggenheim 2005) that journalists 
have lauded as “stars” of the World Bank’s portfolio (Mallaby 2004).  While previous projects 
had attempted to build on participatory institutions, they had largely placed authority in the hands 
of local officials and thus worked within the institutional confines of the New Order regime – 
with the associated negative externalities of corruption, cronyism and graft.   KDP’s logic was to 
attempt to retain the spirit of svadaya gotong royong but create new spheres of authority  within 
SPGs that were more associated with reform: such as elected village committees and watchdogs 
drawn from local journalists and NGO workers
15. Thus, an SPG optic was consciously employed 
to remake the approach of local development so that it was better aligned with the spirit of the 
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Catholic and Protestant, may also play a role, and in other parts Hindu temples and Buddhist viharas may 
provide alternative sources of authority.   
15 A quantitative analysis of the LLI data show that a household’s participation in village government SPGs 
has an adverse effect on the voice and participation of neighboring households – demonstrating the 
“chilling” effect of SPGs that have their origins in the New Order (Alatas, Pritchett and Wetterberg  - 
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Indonesian reform movement.  This represents an important attempt to make development more 
ethnographically informed and place the design of interventions squarely within cultural 
contexts
16.   
This style of development works because it has a long-term horizon, careful monitoring, 
constant learning by doing, all of which go against the myopia inherent within old-style  
development.  Old style development is technocratic: predicated on excessive reliance on a 
“model” – either based on a “best-practice” framework (a project design that worked wonders in 
one place would have the same impact another), or on methodologically individualist rational-
choice modeling that is totally ignorant of symbolic, social and cultural logic. Bringing in an SPG 
optic reveals the real challenge of development, its role as an agent of cultural and political 
change.  Dealing with these challenges, which have always been present but rarely confronted, 
requires a new way of doing development that is more decentralized, more difficult, more honest, 
and – arguably – more sustainable
17.   
 
Democracy and Local Development in India 
India’s nationalist SPG is rather different, and so is its experience with local development.  
Unlike Indonesia its democratic roots date back at least to the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 
1919 (which provided for regular elections to governing bodies and the federal, state and local 
levels), and to the consequent creation of political parties competing for political power.  Also, 
unlike Indonesia, India’s struggle for independence was dominated by Gandhi’s nonviolent 
satyagraha movement.  Armed resistance, while symbolically important, was never at the center 
of power.
18 Despite the trauma surrounding the partition of British India into India and Pakistan, 
when India achieved independence in 1947 the army was subservient to political authority.  The 
Indian constitution, written by lawyers trained in the US and UK, was predicated on making India 
                                                 
16 Not surprisingly, KDP’s founding “task manager,” Scott Guggenheim, was trained as an anthropologist.  
He has a written a fascinating account of KDP’s origins, its struggles, and current mode of operation 
(Guggenheim, 2005). 
17 As an ironic illustration of a clash of civilizations within the changing culture of development 
institutions KDP’s success has caused it to be categorized it as “best-practice”, with its final design 
pitchforked into entirely different cultural contexts. Viewed through the optic of SPGs, the illogic of this 
becomes starkly obvious.  
 
18  Subhash Chandra Bose, a former president of the Indian National Congress, formed the Indian National 
Army that attempted to liberate the country in collaboration with Japanese forces during World War II.     18
a “sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic.”
19  India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru, was deeply influenced by Soviet models of development, but was also a democrat to the 
core.  In Nehru’s India, as in Sukarno’s Indonesia, state action was the key, and included 
centralized planning to promote economic growth and equitable development.  But Gandhi held 
deeply held beliefs that the key to India’s problems lay in village swaraj – village self-rule 
(Gandhi 1962), i.e. in devolving power to autonomous village councils and making them self-
sufficient.  The parallels with svadaya gotong royong are obvious and not necessarily 
coincidental. 
In India the economic model largely failed but the democratic model worked— at least at the 
federal and state levels.  Elections were, and continue to be, run by independent election 
commissions, and the results are viewed as fair as those in any Western democracy.  But at the 
local level democracy, till recently, was not institutionalized.  Even though most state 
constitutions mandated regular elections and varying degrees of fiscal authority to village 
government, elections were rarely held and local governments were, for the most part, toothless. 
(Matthew and Buch 2000). 
Gandhi’s vision of village swaraj led three states to attempt early democratic reforms at the 
local level in the 1970s and 1980s: West Bengal in the east, and Karnataka and Kerala in the 
south.
20  In order to institutionalize and spread democratic decentralization to the rest of the 
country, two amendments to the Indian constitution – the 73
rd and 74
th  - were passed in 1993.  
Among other goals, they mandated that elections to local village councils (panchayats) be 
systematized and supervised by independent election commissions and that they be given more 
fiscal authority and political power.  Another important innovation was that gram sabhas, or 
village assemblies, be held at regular intervals throughout the year.  These are open meetings 
which anyone in the village is free to attend in order to discuss budgets, development plans, the 
selection of beneficiaries, and to interrogate village panchayat and local administrative officials 
on any issue.  A  third key aspect is that seats on panchayats, including the position of the 
panchayat president (pradhan or sarpanch) be reserved for Scheduled Castes and Tribes 
(according to their size in the village population), and women (a third of all seats in the panchayat 
and all presidencies, on a rotating basis).  I will not attempt here to evaluate the impact of the 73
rd 
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and Manor (1998) for Karnataka, and Isaac and Franke (2000) for Kerala.   19
amendment –several research projects are attempting to examine this
21 – but will briefly illustrate 
how thinking about democratic decentralization in India via an SPG lens can provide some useful 
insights.  I will focus on the South Indian states of Kerala and Karnataka
22.     
In the early 1980s the newly elected Janata government in Karnataka passed legislation 
experimenting with setting up structures of local governance. These later became the foundation 
of the 73
rd amendment – including regular elections, the institution of gram sabhas, reservations 
for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and women.  This experiment largely ended in 1991 with the 
election of a Congress-led government in the state.
23   With the passage of the 73
rd amendment, 
regular elections to panchayats continue to be held, but panchayats have very small budgets and 
limited fiscal authority.   In Kerala, on the other hand, a series of Communist governments 
increasingly decentralized authority to local governments.   The momentum of this process was 
vastly increased in 1996, when the Left Democratic Front passed legislation mandating that 40 
percent of total state expenditures be disbursed by local government institutions.  This was 
accompanied by a concerted effort to introduce participatory democracy, not just by ensuring that 
gram sabhas were regularly held, but via links with “planning seminars” held at the ward, village, 
block and district levels to determine the allocation of budgets.  A Left-led People’s Campaign 
for Decentralized Planning facilitated this process by supervising and disseminating information 
about decentralized planning.  Consequently, Kerala’s panchayats have considerably more clout 
than those in any other part of the country (Isaac and Franke 2000).  However, in recent years 
Kerala’s decentralization has seen serious setbacks as a consequence of the LDF’s loss of 
political power, coupled with a serious budget deficit in the state government’s finances. (World 
Bank, 2004) 
The  gram sabha is a particularly important SPG introduced via panchayat reforms.  In 
Kerala, which has high levels of literacy and political awareness, gram sabhas have become 
active institutions for the incorporation of public grievances into the planning process. In 
Karnataka and Kerala, on the other hand, gram sabhas are largely seen as yet another type of top-
down development intervention – representing the power of the state to disrupt existing power 
relations.  For this they are both resented and manipulated by entrenched elites – and used and 
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Chaudhuri and Heller (2004). 
22 It is important to keep in mind that these states are relatively more developed and egalitarian than those 
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appropriated for private benefit by disadvantaged groups.  When gram sabhas were first 
introduced in Karnataka in 1993, many pradhans found them threatening and did not hold them, 
or made then ineffectual by holding them at unannounced times, or staged them in the panchayat 
office instead of in a public area. (Crook and Manor 1998)  This unsanctioned violation of 
government authority was an important signal of their local power.  In more recent data we find 
that,  when they are held, gram sabhas largely serve to identify and allocate benefits targeted to 
mandated groups such as Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC/STs).  Not surprisingly, they are most 
often attended by SC/Sts, and those SC/STs who attend them are also more likely to benefit from 
programs. (Besley, Pande, and Rao 2004c) 
In an interesting demonstration of the hold that the village swaraj/democracy SPG has on 
Indians, democratically elected panchayat-like structures are often spontaneously formed in 
squatter settlements in slums (Jha, Rao and Woolcock, 2004).  Squatter settlements, of course, are 
not officially sanctioned and therefore do not fall within formal institutions of governance.  Yet, 
in work in Delhi slums, we found that immigrant squatters would have regular elections for 
members of panchayats and would also elect a pradhan.  The elections were generally perceived 
as fair even though they were organized by members of the community.  Candidates were usually 
affiliated with political parties, and the winning candidate had electorally legitimized authority.  
This elected pradhan largely functioned as an intermediary between slum-dwellers and agents of 
the state – helping constituents obtain “ration cards,” voter identification cards, and other tokens 
of citizenship.  They also helped them get access to jobs in government offices, and tried to 
persuade bureaucrats to provide public services – such as water trucks and toilets – to the slum.  
Thus, even thought they had no fiscal authority they re-imagined existing SPGs to find a way to 
improve access to the state
24.   
Thus, in India, as in Indonesia, power is largely a matter of controlling and accessing the 
apparatus of state.  But unlike Indonesia, the strategies in India for manipulating power come via 
control of the political process.  Therefore electoral turnout is very high –about 70 percent for 
village panchayat elections. (Besley, Pande, and Rao 2004b)  Public goods are almost entirely 
centrally funded – with only 24 percent of households claiming that have made any contribution 
towards their provision (about half the percentage in Indonesia).  Public goods, such as schools, 
roads and clinics, are therefore hybrid SPGs – symbols of the largesse of the state rather than 
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“owned” by the community.  As a result, they represent opportunities for private appropriation – 
manifested in high levels of absenteeism by schoolteachers, medical workers, and other state 
employees, and in corruption by panchayats when giving contracts.  With the exception of 
Kerala, panchayats have very small budgets. Their funds are largely acquired from a small house 
tax, and petty taxes which validate transactions such as land sales. Most of a panchayat’s budget 
is currently derived from programs with targeted beneficiaries—such as housing for SC/STs and 
food for work programs—over which pradhans have very little discretion.  Yet, success in 
panchayat elections is a stepping stone to higher elected office, and pradhans can control 
relatively lucrative contracts for village public goods. High positions in panchayats are, therefore, 
rather highly valued, and panchayat elections are often very competitive, being structured around 
the same party-based competition prevalent in state and national elections (even though some 
states officially ban party affiliations in panchayat elections).  Despite this, panchayats do 
manage to get things done, often by acting as intermediaries to divert state government projects 
and funds to their villages.  And pradhans provide public goods in a manner entirely consistent 
with the incentives of electoral competition – tending to take more care of their own constituents, 
their home village, and their caste (Besley, Pande and Rao 2004a). 
  It should be apparent that the “nationalist” SPG in India is based on notions of liberty and 
universal franchise, coupled with Gandhian beliefs about village self-sufficiency.  These have 
succeeded in bringing democracy and political competition to the lowest levels of government 
and given democracy deep roots. Yet, with the exception of Kerala, state panchayats do not yet 
have much financial power: the provision of public goods remains largely with officials at higher 
levels of government.  Consequently, panchayats tend to be viewed as symbols of state 
government rule and are manipulated for private benefit.  This lack of fiscal decentralization and 
the consequent symbolic lack of “ownership” of public goods, as well as the lack of 
accountability at local level, makes the delivery of public services very inefficient.  An SPG lens 
would suggest that public policy should strengthen panchayat institutions to allow for greater 
local level control, which would then increase both symbolic and political accountability and 
improve the efficiency of public service delivery.  
Conclusion:   
The comparison between India and Indonesia suggests a different kind of equity-efficiency 
tradeoff.  Indonesia chose a vision of nationalism that emphasized local participation, in a manner 
that may have regressively taxed the poor. It was also coercive, and, being enforced by the power   22
of military dictatorship, helped abrogate individual liberty.    But it did result in the efficient 
delivery of public services. India chose a different path. It emphasized democracy and universal 
franchise even in village government.  This, for the most part, resulted in inefficient public 
service delivery, keeping India well behind Indonesia in human development indicators despite 
similar levels of per capita income.    
An understanding of Symbolic Public Goods provides a useful way of understanding why 
Indonesia and India had diverged so much, and also suggests some avenues for public action.  It 
is crucial to understand how symbols of nationalism play a role in local governance and  
community action.  These can have important material implications.  On the other hand, material 
objects – such as mosques, temples, and less obviously, schools and clinics -  also serve a 
symbolic purpose.  Understanding their symbolic meaning can contribute towards a better 
understanding of how communities function, and of how to make public service delivery more 
effective and inclusive.  However, these meanings can change – and sometimes change very 
quickly – both because they can be explicitly manipulated in contests for power, but also because 
they are influenced by the external political and economic environment.  This ability of SPGs to 
change can provide guidance on how shifting their symbolic functions can lead to more effective, 
and equitable, local development.    
Local development in Indonesia would be foolish to ignore the obvious advantages that 
can be gained from harnessing the value of participation. But the challenge is to do this less 
coercively, more inclusively and with greater electoral accountability.  This is the task that KDP 
has taken on.   Local development in India would be negligent if it ignored the tremendous 
achievement of thriving democracies at the village level. But these village governments need to 
be given fiscal teeth so that public goods can be brought within the purview of power exercised 
by locally accountable governments.  But democracy needs to be “deepened” (Appadurai, 2002) 
in the sense of giving excluded groups, such as slum dwellers and women, avenues to improve 
their access to the apparatus of government, and to external sources of support.  The strategic use 
of SPGs – such as forming informal panchayats in urban areas, or accessing gram sabhas to 
improve access to public services, is one avenue.  But these new SPGs can be threatening to 
existing power structures and have thus not been effectively institutionalized.  This is where 
public action can make a difference by using fiscal and legislative means to strengthen 
institutions of voice, while using alliances with civil society groups, as was done in Kerala, to 
shore up the ability of gram sabhas to fulfill their potential to make panchayats more accountable 
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